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THE DEFENCE OF ENTRAPMENT
JOEL SHAFER AND WILLIAM J. SHERIDAN*

The exact position in law of the agent provocateur and the related
defence of entrapment is, to say the least, unclear. There exist many diverse
points of view with respect to the ingredients of the defence, its definition,
theoretical foundation and entire scope of operation. One cannot even be
sure if such a defence really exists at all in any jurisdiction, for while the
United States Supreme Court is supposed to have firmly entrenched the
doctrine, there have always been very vigorous and well received dissents to
the reasoning of the majority; moreover, some authors have interpreted these
very same majority decisions as completely obliterating the defence.1 In
England and Canada, judicial decisions have completely avoided the issue
except for some obiter comments, even when it was potentially worthy of
consideration on the facts and specifically pleaded by the accused.2 These
cases were resolved on other bases.
Not only is there uncertainty with respect to ingredients and theoretical
basis, there is still dispute over whether entrapment is an issue for the judge or
for the jury, whether it applies to all crimes, even those involving bodily harm
and violence, the criminal culpability of the agent provocateur himself, the
procedural consequences of raising the defence, and its effects, if any, on the
primary and secondary burdens of proof at trial. The only real certainty in
this area is that the courts, excepting those in the United States, consistently
avoid formally recognizing the existence of a legal defence of entrapment, but
in their decisions may effectively achieve a comparable solution. The
impression one gets is that if a person is accused of a crime obviously
manufactured by the police with only the prosecution motive in mind, that
person will probably be acquitted in the U.S., England and Canada.

PART IA.

HISTORY OF ENTRAPMENT

GENERAL

The issue of entrapment almost invariably arises with respect to consensual crimes, the so-called "crimes without a victim". Once society has
deemed certain actions criminal even if there is no complainant, the problem
*Joel Shafer, B.Comm., LL.B. and William J. Sheridan, B.Comm., LL.B., are members
of the 1970 graduating class.
1 William E. Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 245 at 254 (1942).
2
see Lemieux v. The Queen, [1967] S.C.R. 492 and Patterson v. The Queen, [1968]
3 C.R. 23, discussed infra.
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of enforcement is aggravated. As there will be, by definition, no civilian
prosecutor, the police will be driven to adopt positive investigatory and
detection measures should they decide these laws are to be rigorously enforced
-an assumption which might well be the subject of another study. In these
endeavours it will be necessary for them to seemingly participate in the
offence in order to acquire proof of its committal and evidence against an
ultimate accused. Thus comes into being the person known variously as the
undercover agent, police spy or agent provocateur. Our present concern
relates to the issue of what control, if any, a court will exercise over his
activities.
It is universally conceded that the undercover agent may act so as to
provide the opportunity for the commission of the offence; that is, he may be
the catalyst for the transaction. But the problem inevitably arises of the
overly zealous agent whose activities may be alleged to instigate the crime
or to bring about an offence that would never have been otherwise committed.
The liability of the agent provocateur for the commission of such an offence is
considered below. What we wish to examine now is whether or not such
conduct provides the ultimate accused a defence in law. Examples of judicial
condemnation of unconscionable instigation may be found beyond number,
but is the accused provided with a defence thereby?
Until the late nineteenth century no common law court had recognized a
defence of entrapment at all. Instigation of any type was considered totally
irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence, according to the rather overworked
Biblical quotation of 3 Genesis 13:
"And the Lord God said unto the woman: What is this
that thou hast done? And the woman said: The serpent
beguiled me, and I did eat."
An early American case concerning a liquor control regulation actually
denied a defence of entrapment on this authority.3
B.

ENGLAND

Entrapment has never really developed as a defence in its own right in
England. Early cases ignore it completely and, for the most part, it is still
remarkable only for its absence. Where there has been more flagrant abuse
of instigating techniques an argument based on another issue may be accepted
to provide ad hoc relief; but rarely will entrapment itself be faced head-on.
Thus, where a number of persons procured another to rob a co-conspirator
in order to arrest the robber for a reward, it was held there was no actus reus
and the accused exonerated 4 (unfortunately posthumously, for he had already
been executed before the true facts appeared).
In R. v. Mullins,5 one of the Chartist criminal conspiracy cases, the only
issue raised in an entrapment situation was the necessity of corrobation of an
aBd. of Commissioners v. Backus 29 How. Pr. 33 (N.Y. Sup.CL1864).
4R. v. Macdaniel, 168 E.R. 124 (1754).
5 3 Cox Crim. Cases 526 (1848).

1970]
agent provocateur in his role as an accomplice. It was held that the agent
was not a true accomplice and did not require corroboration. Entrapment as
a defence was evidently never mentioned. A similar omission occurred in R.
v. Titley,6 a prosecution resulting from the solicitation of the services of an
abortionist by the police. The facts show misrepresentation and strong inducement, including a finding that the woman involved was not even pregnant.
Yet, the court considered that the only issues were the intent of the accused
and the effectiveness of his methods; the jury convicted. In a rather remarkable Scottish case,7 a police spy induced the defendant to sell her some
whisky, for which sale he had no permit, by strong pleadings that othenvise
she would have to walk some distance. The defendant argued he was entrapped and the court acquitted without reasons, but it must be noted that he also
contended there was a fault in the pleadings.
By 1909 the courts were still concerned only with the evidentiary value
of the agent provocateur's testimony and ruled, following Mullins, that a
police spy is not an accomplice so the rule that a jury should not act on the
uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice does not apply to such a person.8
In Brannanv. Peek9 a police agent entered a pub and placed several bets with
the accused, using repeated entreaties to overcome his hesitancy. At trial a
conviction was entered, but on appeal the accused was set free on the grounds
that a pub is not a public place. Lord Goddard, C.J., calling it a "point of
much greater public importance", stated that the court observed with concern
and strong disapproval that the police "committed an offence to catch a
criminal. .

.

. It is wholly wrong to allow a practice of that sort to take

place". 10 Humphreys, J., said:"

I think the most serious aspect of this case is that not only did the police constable
commit an offence but . . . he encouraged and persuaded another person to
commit an offence.

Thus, we find judicial disapproval of such practices but no indication that the
accused may be accorded a defence thereby.
In a more recent and in some ways more disturbing case,12 two spies
stealthily entered upon a vehicle licenced to carry only members of a club.
Even though no other passengers were shown to be non-members and the
defendant company had no knowledge whatever of the spies' presence, a
conviction was obtained on the doctrine of absolute liability. No sensitivity
to entrapment as a defence was shown, although the practice was again disapproved of. A slightly different approach was taken in R. v. Murphy,'" a
court-martial appeal, in which it was stated that improperly obtained evidence
is not necessarily admissible. The court has some discretion to reject evidence
6

14 Cox Crim. Cases 502 (1880).

7Blaikie v. Linton, 18 Scot. Law Rep. 583 (1880).
8 R. v. Bickley (1909) 73 J.P. 239 (Ct. Cr. Appeal).
9 [1948] 1 KB. 68.
lo Ibid. at p. 72.
1 Ibid. at p. 73.
12Browning v. Watson (Rochester) Ltd. [1953] 1 W.L.R. 1172.
18 [1965] N.I. 138, Ct. M.A.C.
14 [1967] 1 W.L.R. 1051 (Q.B.).
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if, though otherwise admissible, it would operate unfairly against the accused.
This, however, is an extremely tenuous basis for any general conclusion.
Finally, in Sneddon v. Stevenson 4 a police officer drove his car up to
the accused and, when she opened the door, accepted her offer of prostitution.
The court was of the firm opinion that the officer was not a party to the
offence and did nothing reproachable by merely giving the suspect the
opportunity to commit an offence. It is only where an agent provocateur
encourages or incites the commission of an offence that the courts will be
concerned - but exactly what they would do is not stated.
Glanville Williams' 5 observes that some undercover work is necessary
for police effectiveness and that once a judicial restraint is imposed, it would
be difficult to define its limits. Without necessarily approving the situation
he concludes that the issue has not been squarely dealt with in England, and,
as the law now stands, there is certainly no general defence of entrapment.
C.

CANADA

The Canadian cases show a similar trend of pre-occupation with peripheral issues and a failure to come to grips with the main problem. As a
result, there is no definitive rule available and the status of entrapment is

totally uncertain.
In Amsden v. Rodgers'6 a police agent made repeated false representations to the accused, a brakeman with a previously clean record, that*he was
ill and induced the latter to walk to the buffet car, buy him a drink and
bring it back to him in his seat. When the brakeman accepted reimbursement
of the price of the drink on his return the agent charged him with the illegal
sale of liquor. Even more startling than these facts was the conduct of the
court in treating the only issue as one of credibility: the agent testified the
sale took place in one province, the accused said it occurred in another, and
the court was concerned solely with whom to believe.
After holding that an agent provocateur is not an accomplice whose
testimony need be corroborated the court said, regarding the false
representations: 17
... where the false statements are made not for the detection of crime committed
but for the purpose of inducing its commission . . . in order that the person
making these statements may be able to prefer a charge for the offence committed
at his solicitation [the] evidence of such a witness must, in my opinion, be
scrutinized with great care.
And further,18
... where the zeal.., of an officer of the law leads him to make false statements
... in order that he may be able to prosecute the offender, his evidence must be
weighed in the light of the possibility that the same motives might have a tendency
to induce him to color his testimony in order to secure a conviction.

15 Criminal Law: The General Part, pp. 782-89.
16 26 C.C.C. 389 (1916).
17

at p. 391.

18 Ibid.

1970]
But the point we must note is that the matter is treated solely as one of
evidence and the reliability of the agent as witness. There is no mention of a
defence per se even in these extreme circumstances.
After the trial judge concluded that in his opinion the accused must be
acquitted since the agent was not to be believed, he referred to an American
case in which it was said: 19
When in their zeal, or under a mistaken sense of duty, detectives suggest the
commission of a crime or instigate others to take part in its commission in order
to arrest them while in the act, although the purpose may be the capture of old
offenders their conduct is not only reprehensible but criminal, and ought to be
rebuked rather than encouraged by the Courts.

While agreeing that the above has "a great deal of force", he then specifically
refused to adopt it as his own reasoning.
Again, in R. v. McCranor'2 0 a case in which two "whisky detectives"
were employed by the Ontario Liquor Licence Department solely to obtain
evidence of liquor violations, the only issues referred to by both majority
and dissenting judges were the weight to be given to the evidence of a
complainant who invites the accused to commit the offence and the necessity
of corroboration.
A case in which the issue of entrapment could have been dealt with
squarely reached the Supreme Court of Canada in 1967.21 It was uncontroverted on the facts that the defendant was solicited by an informer working
with the police to undertake a break-in. The agent "was to lead a man who at
first had no intention of breaking and entering, who went to the scene of the
crime at B's [the agent] instigation, and who was led into the trap by B".
Thus, the entire scheme can be said to have originated with the police and
those under their control.
As the police had obtained a key from the owner of the premises and
received his consent for the set-up, the court held that no crime was, in fact,
committed as there was no actus reus. But it went on to say: 22
Had Lemieux in fact committed the offence with which he was charged, the
circumstance that he had done the forbidden act at the solicitation of an agent
provocateur would have been irrelevant to the question of his guilt or innocence.
Unless it may be argued that the above is purely obiter, that the conces-

sion of the existence of mens rea which the defence made was crucial, or that
the word "solicitation" does not include all possible instigating conduct, this
decision may preclude further argument relative to entrapment as a defence
in Canada.
In another case which reached the Supreme Court 23 accused was charged
with keeping a common bawdy-house, a police agent having induced the
conduct leading to the charge. The Court acquitted on the ground that no
19 Connor v. People (1893) 36 Am. St. R. 300.
20 44 O.L.R. 482 (1918).

21R. v. Lemieux, [1967] S.C.R. 492.
22
at p. 496.
23 R. v. Patterson, [1968] 3 C.R. 23.
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frequent or habitual use of the house for immoral purposes had been shown,
but no mention of entrapment was made; it does not appear it was even
argued by the defence. The Annotation to the case deplores the fact that no
such argument was made or accepted on the basis that no state can safely
adopt a policy by which crime is artificially propagated.
24
The most recent Ontario case to mention entrapment is R. v. Ormerod.
Ormerod was approached by a person who, unknown to him, was an R.C.M.P.
undercover agent and was asked if he wanted to sell drugs. Ormerod then
took the initiative of contacting another R.C.M.P. agent and, under the
impression he was now working for the latter, procured drugs for the undercover man. He was thereupon charged with trafficking in drugs notwithstanding these facts and his lack of prior involvement with drugs. The trial
judge convicted him, holding that these facts did not establish any defence.
In the Court of Appeal, Laskin,
J.A., writing the majority opinion states
25
that the defence of entrapment
: . . goes not to the issue of whether the crime has been committed but to the
issue of whether the methods employed by the police should be tolerated...

In another case, 26 the Ontario Court of Appeal recognizes that the court
is not powerless to prevent abuse of its own process through oppressive
proceedings and seems to suggest that a defence may be available where
there is "calculated inveighing and persistent importuning" beyond ordinary
solicitation; what this means is left open. Laskin, J.A., recognizes this
principle and then quotes Judson, J., in Lemieux 27 and remarks that the
effect of this passage depends on the meaning given the word "solicitation".
Without going further on this issue he rejects the defences that the accused
was immune from prosecution as an agent of the police and that there was no
mens rea, thereby upholding the conviction. However, he then invokes the
discretion of the court and suspends sentence. As a result, no effective support
is given to the establishment of entrapment as a defence in its own right.
28
McGillivray, l.A., dissenting in part, said:
Had it been established that police officers had authorized or even encouraged the
appellant to violate the law by trafficking in marijuana or other drugs, I would
agree some modification in the sentences should be imposed.

But the conviction, of course, would still stand.
Therefore, in Canada as in England no substantial support has been
given to the defence of entrapment. In obvious cases it would seem that the
court may be more willing to acquit on other grounds or may reflect its
disapproval of police conduct by lighter sentences; the defence has never
been supported judicially per se, however. The only general principles which
may be of aid to an accused in an entrapment situation are those of Osborn
as referred to by Laskin, J.A., above and those of R. v. Wray29 where the
24 [1969] 2 O.R. 230.
25 at p. 238.
20 R. v. Osborn [1969] 1 O.R. 152.
27 [1967] S.C.R. 492 at 496.
28 [1969] 2 O.R. 230 at 232.

29

Ontario Court of Appeal, October 1969 as yet unreported.
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Ontario Court of Appeal, in supporting the discretion of a trial judge to refuse
to admit illegally obtained evidence, held it more important to maintain
the integrity of the judicial process by refusing to convict in extreme
circumstances. It is a question of conflicting values and the court has power
to prevent the implication of that which puts the entire judicial system into
disrepute.
D.

UNITED STATES

The position which the American courts have taken on the issue of
entrapment is quite different from that of their English and Canadian counter-

parts. Judges at all levels of the state and federal court systems have discussed
entrapment fully and have established it as a recognized defence which, when
successfully argued, leads to an absolute acquittal. Even though the defence
has been approved by the Supreme Court of the United States, however, the

exact basis on which it rests has never been made clear and there is no
comprehensive explanation of its theory. The definition universally accepted
is that of Roberts, J., in Sorrells v. U.S.30
Entrapment is the conception and planning of a crime by an officer and his

procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except
for the trickery, persuasion or fraud of the officer.

As in England, there would appear to be no mention of such a defence
in the American courts before the late nineteenth century; but once introduced in the United States it spread quickly throughout both federal and
state court systems and gained widespread approval. In 1880 the eighth edition
of Wharton3l mentions entrapment for the first time but denies that it is a
defence; by 1896, however, the tenth edition 32 concedes that it is a defence
and that the government is precluded from prosecuting should it be established.
Entrapment was first recognized in the state courts 33 and by 1894
reported cases of its acceptance as a defence were quite common. It then was
adopted by the federal courts as an established principle. In U.S. v. Whittier,34
where the charge was sending obscene matter through the mails, it was held,
relying on Macdaniel,35 that no crime was committed against the statute
setting out an offence in an entrapment situation. A concurring judgment
said, "no court should.., lend its countenance to contrivances for inducing a
person to commit a crime". 36
In U.S. v. Adams,3 7 another obscene mails prosecution, a conviction
was quashed on appeal when it was shown there was continued solicitation
30 287 U.S. 435 at 454 (1932).
31 1 Wharton, Criminal Law, p. 142 (8th ed. 1880).
32 1 Wharton, Criminal Law, p. 166, (10th ed. 1896).
33

Michigan v. Saunders, 38 Mich. 218 (1878)

O'Brien v. State, 6 Tex. Cr. App.

665 (1879). For a full discussion of the early cases see Mikell, Entrapment in the

FederalCourts, 90 U. Pa. L. Rev. 245 (1942).

34 5 Dill. 41.
35 Supra, n.4.
36 5 Dill. 41.

37 59 Fed. 674 (1894).
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by government agents and a reluctance by the defendant to commit the
offence from the beginning. The court cited the concurring opinion in
Whittier'8 and the decision in Saunders39 as authority. Entrapment was first
mentioned in the Supreme Court of the United States in Grimm v. U.S.,40 yet
another obscene mails case, but because the court decided that the actions of
the police officer did not amount to an inducement to commit the offence
the accused was convicted. There was no full discussion of the defence at that
time.
One of the more grimly humorous cases is U.S. v. Healy.41 Government
agents disguised an Indian as a white man and sent him into a liquor store
with marked money after teaching him one English word, "whisky". When
the proprietor served his innocent-looking customer he was charged with
providing alcohol for an Indian. In acquitting the defendant the court said
the government42 agents' invitation to crime "doth work an estoppel" to
conviction and,

Though the seller has violated the statute, he was the passive instrument of the
government, and his is a blameless wrong for which he cannot be justly convicted.

The issue of entrapment was first dealt with fully at the circuit court
level in Woo Wai v. U.S.43 Immigration officials felt the accused had considerable information regarding the illegal smuggling of Chinese into the
United States from Mexico, even if he did not actually partake in this. To get
the information they set out to entrap him into committing an offence and
then using the threat of prosecution to blackmail him. He refused to go along
with any of a number of schemes proposed until repeated entreaties and pleas
won him over. When he later refrained from giving any further information, a
charge of conspiracy to violate the immigration laws was laid against him. In
reversing the conviction the circuit court stated it would apply a test of who
conceived the original criminal design. Here, the primary intention to commit
crime was not in the defendant and he was induced to go along only by
44
sustained pressure. The court went on to say,
it is against public policy to sustain a conviction obtained in the manner
which is disclosed by the evidence in this case .... a sound public policy can
be upheld only by denying the criminality of those who are thus induced to
commit acts which infringe the letter of the criminal statutes.

This decision is all the more important because it was the first in a federal

jurisdiction to expressly rule that, although defendant had committed the
crime with which he was charged, he was still entitled to be acquitted on
grounds of entrapment.
The defence was used extensively in liquor prosecutions during the
Prohibition Era 45 but was slow to reach the Supreme Court. Certiorariwas
S8 Supra, n.34.
39 Supra, n. 33.
40 156 U.S. 604 (1895).

41202 Fed. 349 (1913).
42 Ibid., at p.350.
43 223 Fed. 412 (1915).
44 Ibid., at 415.
45
See Annot. 86 A.L.R. 263 (1933).
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probably not readily granted because the nature of the crimes in relation to
which entrapment usually arises involves inherent enforcement difficulties
and necessitates reliance upon the agent provocateur. A conclusive judicial
opinion before the issue was ripe might have led to an undesirable curtailment
of police practice at a time when it was already seen as woefully inadequate.
By 1928, however, Brandeis, J., in a very powerful dissent, had called for
46
complete acceptance of the defence:
[The] prosecution should be stopped, not because some right [of the defendant]
has been denied, but in order to protect the Government. To protect it from illegal
conduct of its officers. To preserve the purity of [the] courts.

This dissent, the growing acceptance of entrapment in the lower courts
and the unpopularity of the National Prohibition Act finally led to a complete
analysis of the problem by the Supreme Court in Sorrells v. U.S. 47 The
decision in this case firmly entrenched and authorized the defence, even
though the basis for its acceptance was not made totally clear. M, a prohibition agent, posed as a tourist and visited accused in his home. A friendly
conversation ensued during which M related that they were members of the
same army division in the First World War and they reminisced about common
experiences. M then asked if he could buy some whisky and accused replied
he had none; a second request yielded the same result. Finally, after some
talk about the army, M asked again. This time accused agreed and left his
house, returning in a short time with a small quantity. M was the only one
to mention whisky each time and the defendant was of good general
character with no previous connections with alcohol. The Supreme Court
held, reversing all lower court decisions, that conviction is improper where
the acts alleged to constitute the offence were committed solely upon the
instigation of an agent provocateur.
Here, the act was said to be the creature of the agent's purpose and he
lured defendant, otherwise blameless, to its commission by persistent solicitation and resort to sentiment. The court was unanimous in the conclusion that
a conviction must be set aside where the original criminal intent comes from
a government agent who implants in the mind of an innocent person the
disposition to commit an offence in order to prosecute him for it. On the
other hand, the fact that an agent merely provides an opportunity for the
commission of a crime would be no defence. Past this, however, the court
split five to four on three major issues; the basis of the defence, how it arises
in the context of a trial and whether it is a matter of fact or law.
It was universally hoped that when the problem next came before the
Supreme Court these differences would be resolved. Such was not to be the
case, however. In Sherman v. U.S. 48 an agent provocateur who met the
accused at a narcotic addicts' treatment centre resorted to repeated appeals to
sympathy and finally induced the latter to procure some drugs for him. In
the process the accused was prompted to take up the habit again. The
majority of the Court, in a decision written by Warren, C.J., followed the
46

Casey v. U.S. 276 U.S. 413 (1928) at 425.

47 287 U.S. 435 (1932).

48 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
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majority in Sorrells, while a strong concurring judgment supported the
minority viewpoint.
Nothing further was added to this dichotomy in Masciale v. U.S.
decided by the Supreme Court on the same day as Sherman.

PART 1 -

9

THEORETICAL BASIS IN LAW

If there is some uncertainty with respect to other aspects of entrapment,
there is complete confusion over the theoretical basis on which to lay its
foundation in law. The United States Supreme Court has articulated convincingly upon the subject, but there have been vigorous and well received
dissents to the reasoning; in England and Canada, no judicial attempt to spell
out a theoretical basis can be found.
In Woo Wai (supra), the first "big" case in the U.S. concerned with
entrapment, acquittal is based on a notion of pure public policy. Where an
accused is enticed by an agent into a crime he would not otherwise have committed, he must be excused because: ".... a served public policy can be upheld
only by denying the criminality of those who are thus induced to commit acts
which infringe the letter of criminal statutes." 5 0
Other U.S. cases bring in the concept of estoppel. The headnote of U.S.
v. Lynch 11reads in part:
The government held estopped from prosecuting a defendant for offering a bribe
to secure a government contract for his firm on the ground that the offer was
induced by an army officer at the instance of Military Intelligence Department
for the purpose of entrapment.
While other support of estoppel as a theoretical basis for entrapment can be
found,12 Glanville Williams disputes its applicability on the ground that
estoppel against a prosecuting sovereign has never been judicially recognized.53
Neither of the above two bases has been referred to by the U.S. Supreme
Court and it appears that they are ignored in most current cases.
When the highest American court chose to speak out on entrapment, it
found itself badly split on this question of theory. In Sorrels, Hughes, J.,
writing the majority decision held that, in an entrapment situation, no crime is
committed because on the basis of statutory interpretation Congress cannot be
said to have intended the law to cover such a situation. This conduct, induced
as it was by the police agent, was not foreseen to be proscribed and the
accused must be acquitted because his actions do not fall within the intend49 356 U.S. 386 (1958).
50 U.S. v. Woo Wai 223 Fed. 412 (1915) at 415; see De Feo, op. cit., p. 253.
51 U.S. v. Lynch 256 Fed. 983 (1918).
62 Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, in Cassey v. U.S., 276 U.S. 413 (1928), also
used estoppel; estoppel put forth by Wharton, Criminal Law, (10th ed. 1896) p. 166.
53 op. cit., p. 785.

19701

287

ment of the legislation. To the prosecution's contention that motive and
inducement are irrelevant, the majority replied that it is the function 54of the
court to ensure that the application of law is not foreign to its purpose:
Literal interpretation of statutes at the expense of the reason of the law and
producing absurd consequences or flagrant injustice has frequently been condemned.

As it was not the law's intent that it should be abused to lure innocents and
then prosecute them, the Government's case fails.
Hughes, J., went on to emphasize that, in the majority opinion, no court
may find an accused guilty and then provide immunity. The basis of the
defence is that the defendant's actions are not outlawed by the Act in the first
55
place:
Fundamentally, the question is whether the defence ..

takes the case out of the

purview of the statute because it cannot be supposed that Congress intended that

the letter of its enactment should be used to support such a gross perversion of
its purpose.

Furthermore, the defence is the same as any other and is raised by a plea of
"not guilty". If facts are produced which may go to prove it, the trial judge
must properly charge the jury and leave it to them as a question of fact
whether or not the statute has been violated.
In a concurring opinion, Roberts, J., with whom Brandeis and Stone, JJ,
agreed, based the defence upon other considerations. He rejected the statutory
construction basis as being artificial, uncertain of application, and too liable
to be defeated by legislative amendment. The reading into statutes of a
provision which Congress did not put therein nor even vaguely hint at amounts
to judicial amendment, and while Congress can overrule or alter a court
judgment, a court must accept a statute as it stands. Furthermore, the
majority basis could easily be viewed as analagous to clemency which is within
the sole jurisdiction of the Executive branch of government.
The concurring judgment would rest the defence on a concept of judicial
integrity, i.e. the inherent power of a court to refuse to be involved in
disreputable conduct. Although the defendant has committed the acts alleged
and otherwise falls within the Act, the court may refuse to convict on the
basis that this would be less harmful to the judicial process than the sanctioning of such police conduct. Thus, the concurring judgment, 56
. . . frankly recognizes the true foundation of the doctrine in the public policy
which protects the purity of government and its processes. . . . Neither courts
of equity nor those administering legal remedies tolerate the use of their processes to consummate a wrong.

Again, 57

The doctrine rests, rather, on a fundamental rule of public policy. The protection
of its own functions and the preservation of the purity of its own temple belongs
only to the court.

The defence is therefore unique in that it is based principally upon the actions
of the police. It is best raised before the trial begins by a motion to quash the
54 Ibid. p. 446.
55 Ibid. at p. 452.
56 Ibid. at p. 455.
57 Ibid. at p. 457.
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indictment. If the facts are clear the judge must rule on them as a question of
law and the case will only proceed before the jury for a determination of facts
in dispute. Once those facts are found, the ruling still falls back on the judge.
Warren, C.S., writing the majority decision in Sherman, adopted the
reasoning of Hughes and held entrapment to be a defence because Congress
could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced against persons,
otherwise innocent, who were induced to commit the offence by government
agents. He pointedly refused to support Roberts in Sorrells but went on to
say that he did not necessarily reject the Roberts' view.
A concurring judgment written by Frankfurter, J., supports the minority
in Sorrells. Entrapment is a matter of law according to which,5 8
The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant not because his conduct falls
outside the proscription of the statute but because even if his guilt be admitted
the methods employed on behalf of the Government to bring about conviction
cannot be countenanced.

The true issue, accordingly, is not whether the defendant falls within the
statute but whether a conviction will bring disrepute to law enforcement: 9
The crucial question ... is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular
case falls below standards to which common feelings respond for the proper use
of governmental power.
Even though the above conflict exists, all United States' courts have been
unanimous in holding that it is proper police practice to provide an opportunity
for the unwary criminal to commit an offence; what must be guarded against
is the ensnarement of an unwary innocent. For the difference between opportunity and enticement two cases have been generally accepted as providing
some guidelines.6 0 From U.S. v. Becker 6l it is taken that opportunity only is
shown by,
. , . an existing course of similar conduct; the accused's already formed design

to commit the crime or similar crimes; his willingess to do so, as evidenced by
ready complaisance.
And from U.S. v. Washington62 inducement may be shown by,
any effective appeal made by the agents to the impulses of compassion, sympathy,
pity, friendship, fear, or hope, other than the ordinary expectation of gain and
profit incident to the traffic...
There is yet another approach which is not really an approach at all that of conspicuously ignoring the entire issue and providing a remedy, where
required, by some other means. To date, this has been the English and
Canadian judicial policy. In Amsden v. Rodgers63 the accused was acquitted
on a jurisdictional issue; in Lemieux, 64 on a finding of no actus reas; and in
Patterson65 on a technicality of evidence. Thus, the remedy is informal,
,8Ibid., at p. 380.
69 Ibid., at p. 382.
60 For a full discussion of the difference between opportunity and enticement see 18
A.L.R. 146 as supplemented by 66 A.L.R. 478 and 86 A.L.R. 263.
0162 F 2d 1007 at 1008 (1933).
62 20 F 2d 160 at 163 (1927).
63 (1916) 26 C.C.C. 389.
64 [1967] SCR 492.
65 [1968] 3 C.R. 23 (S. Ct. Can.).
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selective, and totally at the discretion of the judge. It is just part of the more
general theory that the court has all necessary powers to prevent the abuse
and to maintain the integrity of its process.
As a result of this policy, entrapment is not formally recognized as a
defence and no theoretical basis need be formulated. Perhaps there is some
logic in this for several learned authors have decided that there is no
theoretical justification for a formalized defence. Glanville Williams, in
rejecting estoppel, says 'There is no other ready made doctrine to cover the
situation'.6 6 The basis may not even be too crucial, for as Professor Mikell
67
points out:
In truth there seems to be no rational basis for the doctrine of entrapment. Its

origin is to be found in the natural feeling, shared by judges, that a person should
not be made the victim of what Mr. Justice Holmes called . . . "dirty business."
Moved by this detestation and, in a lesser degree, by sympathy for the 'unwary'
'innocent' defendant the courts have groped for some legal principle on which to

render nugatory the acts of the officer or to excuse the entrapped defendant.

PART
A.

mD-

THE APPLICATION IN COURT

TESTS

As we have seen, there is unanimity of opinion upon neither the existence
of the defence of entrapment, nor its basis in' law or theory. Yet, even if we
wish only to consider whether or not it is desirable, some explanation of how
it is to be applied in an actual trial court setting must be formulated. We
must consider what charge the presiding judge could give to a jury or the
direction he must himself follow, the evidentiary problems which would arise
according to the test used, and the basic differentiation between matters of
fact and those of law.
Three separate tests have been proposed in the American courts, two
of which have been extensively used and have considerable support; the
third is usually mentioned only for the purpose of rejecting it. Not only the
verbal formulae of the two major tests differ. They present widely different
considerations and the adoption of one over the other is a decision which
goes to the root of all other issues including the purpose of the defence and its
place in a legal system.
The test least often mentioned and, of course, less often supported is one
which concerns itself with the reasons for the approach of the defendant by
the agent provocateur and is usually called a "reasonable cause" test. According to it, one must determine the purpose for which the police or their agents
first decided to concentrate upon the accused and then ask if they acted upon
reasonable suspicion. If the answer is in the affirmative, the defence of entrapment fails and the trial proceeds as if it were not in issue. Only if the defence
66

Glanville Williams, op. cit., p. 785.

67 Mikell, op. cit., p. 263.
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can show the police acted without reasonable cause will a defence be
established. Suffice to say this test is realistic in neither basis nor purpose and
we were able to find no reputable authority which supported it.
The first of the two tests relied on by theorists and judges is variously
called one of "creative activity" or "origin of intent". It is highly subjective
and seeks to enquire into the state of mind of the accused at the time he was
first approached by a police agent. If he had a perfectly innocent intent and
was induced to commit the offence only by virtue of the prodding of the
agent provocateur, the defence is established. Put another way, it is sufficient
to show that the crime would never have been committeed but for the instigation of the government agent. Courts which have applied this test, however,
have emphasized that if the accused was of a state of mind in which he already
had a general criminal intent and was merely awaiting an opportunity for
implementing that design, the furnishing of it by the police provides no defence
whatever. This is most often referred to as his "pre-disposition" and the
problems involved in determining such an elusive factor are considered below.
Those judges and writers who support the origin of intent test are
usually, but not always, those who accept the majority decisions in Sherman
and Sorrells. As these opinions are the ratios of the leading Supreme Court
cases it is logical that this test is the one most frequently used in the American
courts.68 Its general characteristic is a concentration upon the accused himself
and his actions rather than upon the methods of inducement. Only if he can
show that the seed and nourishment of the criminal plan lay in the government's agent can the accused succeed; he must establish himself as merely
an unwary innocent.
This test was first suggested in one of the earliest cases to accept entrapment as a defence, O'Brien v. State69 in which it was held to be no crime,
Where the officer first suggests his willingness to a person to accept a bribe to
release a prisoner in charge, and thereby originates the criminal intent...
This case was approved and adopted in Woo Wai v. U.S. 7° It gained the status
of authority when Hughes, J., in Sorrells considered that "the predisposition
and criminal design of the defendant are relevant", 71 and this position was
followed by the majority opinion in Sherman.
An example of this test in practice is shown by Lufty v. U.S.,7 2 a narcotics case, in which it was held that if defendant's evidence that the original
intent lay with the police officers and that he was induced to act by persistent
solicitation is believed, he must be acquitted. Entrapment is established when
the defence shows,73
...

the conception of the criminal design and the planning of the offence by the

enforcement officers, the formation of the intent in their minds, and the pro68 See American Jurisprudence-Drugs (rev'd) s.43 and 18 A.L.R. 146 as supplemented by 66 A.L.R. 478 and 86 A.L.R. 263.
69

6 Tex. Cr. App. 665 at p. 668 (1878).
(1915).

70 223 Fed. 412

71287 U.S. 435 at 451 (1932).
72 198 F 2d 760 (1952), Annotated 33 A.L.R. 2d 883.
73 Ibid., at p. 762.
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curement by misrepresentation and deceit of its commission by appellant, an
otherwise law-abiding innocent person who had no intent to commit [it] until
he was induced to do so by the enforcement officers.
74
It is usually emphasized that,
For the offence to originate in the mind of the defendant, it was not necessary that
[he instigate] the particular sale or act, but only that he have the general intention
to commit such an offence whenever the opportunity offered.
Somehow, he must show he,75
: . . never would have been guilty if the officers of the law had not inspired,
incited, persuaded and lured him to attempt to commit it.
The standard jury charge proposed in American Jurisprudence, Model

Trials76 accepts this subjective test for the most part, without actually saying

so. It begins:
The law is that decoys are permissible to detect criminals but not to create them.
An opportunity may be presented to those having an intent to, or who are willing
to, commit a crime. Where a person has no previous purpose to violate the law,
but is induced or persuaded by law enforcement officers or their agents to commit
a crime, he is entitled to the defence of unlawful entrapment, for, as a matter of
policy, the law forbids conviction in such a case. The law does not permit the
police to ensnare law-abiding citizens into unconscious offending. No officer is
permitted to ensnare a person into committing a crime and then prosecute him.
The other major test concerns itself not at all with subjective elements
but looks only to the activities of the agent provocateur. If he goes past those

standards generally acceptable as being reasonable in the circumstances and
acts in a manner which cannot be condoned according to basic principles of
justice, the defence of entrapment is established and one need not look to the

disposition of the accused. Such a test follows from the concurring opinions
in Sorrells and Sherman which state that the defence is allowed as a protection

of the integrity of the courts and judicial process. An acquittal is demanded so
that improper police conduct is not successful and will be discouraged thereby.
This test has not gained widespread acceptance in the American courts

although it is supported by many writers77 and the suspicion exists that it has
a profound if unspoken importance in the cases.
In U.S. v. Williams78 the use of a contingent fee system whereby the

informer was paid according to the number of convictions obtained was so
repulsive that it was held to be grounds in itself for a defence of entrapment.
And in Waker v. U.S. 7a there was the suggestion that government conduct
which is outrageous will, without more, dictate a finding of entrapment.
After a detailed examination of the entire issue, Donnelly concludes
that as, 80
Entrapment should have its footings in the policy of the courts to preserve their
own integrity . . . the inquiry should be directed solely to the propriety of the
officer's conduct.
74

Demos v. U.S. 205 F 2d 596 at p. 599 (1953).
v. US. 273 Fed. 35 at p. 38 (1921), Annotated 18 A.L.R. 146.
76 Volume 8, p. 573, Section 43.
77
See, for example, R. C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool
Pigeons and Agents Provocateurs,60 Yale L.J 1091 (1951).
78 311 F 2d 441 at 445 (1962).
79 344 F 2d 795 (1965).
80 Op. cit. p. 1112.
75 Butts
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He feels that the origin of intent test is a mere "shibboleth" and we
should examine whether the agent's activities were such that only a chronic
violator would be tempted: 81
If the officer uses inducement that would reasonably overcome the resistance of
one not a chronic offender . . . the court should find as a matter of law that
there was entrapment.

This test, according to which intention is not in issue, has the advantage
of at least apparent simplicity. The mind need not be explored and only
objective facts are relevant. It has been expressly supported in preference
to the origin of intent test by the American Law Institute s2 and has been
incorporated into the proper verbal formula of the defence in the Model
Penal Code: 8 3
A public law enforcement official or a person acting in co-operation with such
an official perpetrates an entrapment if, for the purpose of obtaining evidence
of the commission of an offence, he induces or encourages another person to
engage in conduct constituting such offence by either,
(a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that
such conduct is not prohibited; or
(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial
risk that such an offence will be committed by other than those who are
ready to commit it.

B.

PROBLEMS OF REBUTTAL EVIDENCE

Should the latter objective test be adopted, no special problems of
evidence will arise. The court need concern itself only with external facts
arrived at using the normal rules of trial practice. There may well be difficulties sorting out conflicting versions of those facts and arriving at the true
state of events but this puts the trier of fact in no different position than in
any other case. The only major unique factor is the qualitative decision as to
whether or not the facts so found are of such a nature as to require the
court's disapproval by means of an acquittal. "The test shifts attention from
the record and predisposition of the particular defendant to the conduct of the
police",8 4 and once this is determined, all else is irrelevant; the controlling
issue is whether this conduct falls below standards which the community
considers reasonable for the use of governmental power.
In the origin of intent test, however, the major issue is the defendant's
subjective state of mind and when he raises entrapment as a defence he must
submit himself to "an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own
conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue".8 5 Thus, two new
factors are introduced: the trier of fact must be concerned with subjective
elements and all evidence tending to illustrate "predisposition" becomes
admissible. The latter is a true Pandora's Box.
81 Ibid. p. 1114.
82 Proceedings, 36th Annual Meeting 1959 pp. 225-34.
83 s. 2.13 (1962).
84De Feo, Entrapment As a Defence to Criminal Responsibility, U. of San Fran-

cisco L. Rev. Vol. 1, No. 2, April 1967, 243 at 266.
85

Donnelly, op. cit. p. 1105.
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The present Canadian law is that in a criminal trial the Crown may not
introduce evidence of the accused's character in order to show him as a
person more likely to have committed a crime. However, should the accused
adduce evidence of his good reputation, the Crown is free to rebut this and
may even bring in proof of previous convictions.8 6 In the United States, "such
testimony is properly confined to the mere fact of general reputation, the
courts refusing to permit proof of particular acts".8 7 In either jurisdiction,
should the accused himself enter the witness box his character is relevant
as to the issue of credibility, the same as for any other witness.
With respect to the determination of predisposition, on the other hand,
the American courts are unanimous in holding that rebuttal evidence by the
prosecution can go much further than the above, irrespective of whether or not
accused gives testimony and regardless of its prejudicial effect as an attack
upon his character.8 8 Generally, all evidence tending to show his willingness
to violate the law at any time is admissible including prior convictions, indictments on which he was acquitted, complaints and investigations concerning
him, and, basically, all aspects of his previous conduct.8 9 Even hearsay and
opinion evidence are allowed. 90
The implications of this are evident. By raising what may well be a valid
and honest defence, the accused leaves himself open to potentially damning
character evidence on matters totally irrelevant to the charge. Even if it were
relevant, the inflammatory effects may, by themselves, be sufficient to convict
him. And as his character is already in issue he is virtually forced to abandon
his rights against self-incrimination and give testimony on his own behalf. By
some strange and inexplicable logic this is rationalized: 91
If in consequence he suffers disadvantage, he has brought it upon himself by
reason of the nature of the defense.

The real question becomes whether, considering the potential prejudice
involved, raising the defence is more. harmful than not. Only in a few cases
has a court interjected a test of relevancy so that highly inflammatory but
minimally relevant evidence is excluded.92
C.

FACT OR LAW: JUDGE OR JURY

Finally, it must be determined who will be the final arbiter of the
defence, trial judge or jury. The minority opinion, based again on the concurring judgments in Sorrells and Sherman, contends that as it is a judicial

device used to control the use of government power and protect the integrity
of the courts it must be considered wholly a question of law to be ruled on by
the judge alone. The supporters of this view point out that only the judge may
8

6Criminal Code, s. 573.
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properly consider the matters of policy which will inevitably arise. In addition,
a body of precedent can be established to guide future courts, inflammatory
evidence is kept away from a supposedly vulnerable jury, and guidelines are
created for the police in order that undesirable conduct not be repeated.
The more widely held opinion, however, is that the defence of entrapment is properly a question of fact to be determined, as are other defences,
by the jury upon being properly charged. The onus falls to the judge on
only two occasions: first, if there is no real evidence of entrapment he will
rule it out and instruct the jury to ignore it; secondly, if there is overwhelming
evidence to support the defence he may rule on it himself as a question of law.
The actual result in Sherman was based on a finding that this latter situation
existed and that a directed verdict of acquittal was required. Where there is
doubt, however, the issue must be presented to the jury.

PART IV -

LIABILITY OF THE AGENT PROVOCATEUR

The liability of an agent provocateur is only one segment of the total
relationship between citizens and the police. Both must be controlled in our
society by the criminal process; offenders from both sectors must be punished.
On the other hand neither must be unduly hampered, for if this were the case
we would be left with either uncontrolled violence or a police state. So,
again, a balance must be struck. A citizen has the traditional civil remedies
against unwarranted police conduct - assault, battery, malicious prosecution
and false imprisonment. In addition, an accused has procedural safeguards:
if a confession is not voluntary it is inadmissible in evidence against him; an
accused is not compelled to give evidence. 93 Yet, physical evidence obtained
during such police conduct as would render a confession inadmissable, is
94
itself perfectly admissible and often proves fatal to an accused's defence.
There are, however, no special common law rules or procedural safeguards
concerning agents provocateurs. The reason for this, it is submitted, lies in
the fact that, traditionally, agents provocateurs have been considered liable to
the same legal penalties as ordinary citizens. The best statement of this
point of view is found in Brannan v. Peek, where Lord Goddard, in discussing
the activity of an undercover policeman who purposefully enticed the defendant into an illegal bet, said:9 5
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that, unless an Act of Parliament provides
for such a course of conduct-and I do not think any Act of Parliament does
so provide-it is wholly wrong for a police officer or any other person to be sent
to commit an offence in order that an offence by another person may be detected.
It is not right that police authorities should instruct, allow or permit detective
officers or plain clothes constables to commit an offence so that they can prove
that another person committed an offense.
93
9

lbrahim v. The King, [1914] A.C. 599.

4 Kuruma v. R., [1955] A.C. 197.
95 [1947] 2 ALL E.R. 572 at 573-4.
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This position of strict adherence to the letter of the law has been
criticized by Glanville Williams, who would emphasize the other side of the
coin:

96

If the letter of the law were applied too strictly, it would seriously hamper the
action of the police in apprehending offenders.

Williams goes on to suggest that on certain occasions the police may infringe
the letter of the law, where their conduct is "proper". If their conduct is
"improper", the police should be held accountable, and in drawing this
distinction between proper and improper conduct Williams employs the common law doctrine of necessity. Hence, where an officer must breach a law in
order to capture an offender (e.g., possession of illegal drugs with a view to
selling them to a suspected pusher), the law will, as a matter of public policy,
excuse the officer, for otherwise there would be no meaningful, practical way
to enforce statutes such as the Narcotic Control Act (Canada). To demonstrate William's position more forcibly, he considers the police techniques
used in Brennan acceptable, and would excuse the undercover officer from
criminal responsibility: this was "proper" action.9 7
A recent English case appears to dilute Lord Goddard's strict adherence
position and to support the Williams position. In Sneddon v. Stevenson, the
prostitution case already discussed (supra), the court specifically refers to the
passage from Brennan quoted above after commenting: 98
All that the officer did was to place himself and the car in such a position that
if appellant desired to solicit there was full opportunity to do so. In my
judgment that does not mean that the officer commits any offence at all.

Hence, Lord Goddard's position appears to have been weakened in England;
these cases also represent convincing authority in Canada.
In Canada there can be found many examples where police officers and
agents have been convicted for participating in the offence for which they were
endeavouring to obtain a conviction. In R. v. Petheran,the head-note reads: 99
A police officer purchasing liquor from one unlawfully selling it in violation of the

Government Liquor Control Act, 1924 (Alta.) c.14, in order to obtain evidence
of law violation against the seller, commits an offense under s.84 of the Act...
and he cannot justify the act because of a duty performed under instructions of

a superior officer....

One extremely important element, little discussed in the texts, is that the
police have a large discretion in the decision whether to arrest or not,including
arrests of fellow constables. This is not to suggest that officers are not
charged when they exceed their powers, but surely it can be the only explanation for why the officers involved in both the Lemieux and Patterson cases
(supra) were not brought to trial. Perhaps internal police discipline procedures were applied and considered adequate. Nevertheless, in charging a
policeman or agent with exceeding his authority in law, the broad police
discretion is always a first, and perhaps decisive, hurdle. This aspect of the
issue must not be lost to sight in any overall conclusion.
96 Glanville Williams, op. cit., p. 796.
97 ibid.

98 [1967] 1W.L.R. 1051 at 1056.
99 R. v. Petheran, (1936) 65 C.C.C. 151.
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One argument often advanced in favour of excusing an agent from what
would otherwise be a crime is that contained in the old U.S. case of State v.
Trophy.100 Here the mayor, endeavouring to stamp out gambling in his town,
designated a detective to obtain evidence against certain suspects. The agent
accomplished this task by participating in a poker game with the latter; he was
charged but, on appeal, acquitted on the basis that the requisite intent was
missing. That this reasoning carries little force, especially in Ontario, is aptly
demonstrated in R. v. Omerod, where Laskin, J.A., in considering Trophy,
held:101
•.. I find it difficult to support the judgment [in Trophy] on the ground on which
it was put, because a general want of intent to break the law is not a defense where
a person carries out forbidden acts intending to do them or knowing what he is
in fact doing. That he does them for a laudable purpose or from a high motive
... is beside the point.
The principle defense argued in Ormerod was that of public duty; that is,
since Ormerod was acting as a police agent, he was immune from prosecution
because the breach occurred in the enforcement of his public duty. This, of
course, is the principle recommended earlier by Williams, extended on the
doctrine of agency to cover police agents as well as actual constables. Once
again Laskin, J.A., unequivocally and decisively proclaims that no such
justification exists (at least in Canada):102
In principle, the recognition of 'public duty' to excuse breach of the criminal law
by a policeman would involve a drastic departure from constitutional precepts
that do not recognize official immunity, unless statute so prescribes...
Legal immunity from prosecution for breaches of the law by the very persons
charged with a public duty of enforcement would subvert that public duty.
Hence, in this jurisdiction, the Williams approach is rejected on the basis that,
despite judicial distaste for agents provocateurs, recognition of an immunity
"would mean the abandonment of legal control over them".' 0
It is interesting to note that Laskin, in rejecting Williams' suggestion,
does not come down in favour of strict adherence to the letter of the law,
given earlier by Lord Goddard. He does not really supply a substitute, but
hints implicity at specific statutory exception and police discretion as being
the only shield from prosecution for an agent provocateur, and in this he is
10 4
probably close to Lord Goddard. Brannan is cited, but not commented on.
With respect to police discretion in making arrests and laying charges, the
learned justice implies that this, as a source of immunity for police officers, is a
matter best left to unwritten police discretion as opposed to formalizing any
written rules of law. He says:105
How far such immunity exists in the exercise of discretionary power [by the police]
not to prosecute is unknown to me, but even if it be considerable, the fact that
it does not reside in a settled rule is a safeguard.
The implication appears to be that if the police, in the discharge of their
discretionary power to arrest or not, do arrest an agent provocateur, then
100 State v. Trophy, 78 Mo App 206 (1899), (Kansas Court of Appeal).
101 D. v. Ormerod, [1969] 2 O.R. 230 at 244.
102 ibid., p. 244.
103 per Laskin 3. A., ibid., p. 244.
104 ibid., p. 240.
105 ibid., p. 244.
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once past this hurdle, if there be no specific statutory exoneration, the agent
will have only the customary defences available to him and no devices special
or peculiar to his particular circumstance. Williams' doctrine of necessity is,
then, defeated, unless of course this implication is a misinterpretation of the
above decision.
The question of statutory exoneration now arises. Such a defence must
be found either in the general statute - The Criminal Code (Canada) - or
in a special enactment such as The Narcotic Control Act (Canada). Turning
to the Code, s.407 concerns counselling, procuring, or inciting other persons
to commit offences. Section 21 pertains to parties to offences. From the
wording of these two sections, especially the former, there can be no doubt, at
least in theory, an agent provocateur is included, for it is the essence of
entrapment that the agent incite or counsel his prey to commit a crime. An
agent cannot defend himself on the basis that he did not know he was acting
improperly, for s.10 blocks this approach. Moreover, as we have just seen,
there appears to be no recognized common law defence of immunity, and so
s.7(2) is of no avail to the accused agent. Section 25 of the Code deals with
justification of police actions or actions of persons "in aid of a peace officer".
Clearly an agent provocateur is included within s.25, but just as clearly that
section is not applicable as a defence for him. First, the section imposes
the criteria of acting on "reasonable and probable" grounds, and considering
the strong remarks against entrapping tactics by courts, supra, it is doubtful
whether a court would classify such activity as "reasonable". Secondly, and
more important, the tone of the entire section is to excuse police or their
agents when the use of force or violence has been employed - this aspect
is clearly not the issue with entrapment. Suffice it to say that neither Ormerod,
Lemieux nor Pattersonraised s.25 as a possible defence: it just doesn't meet
the issue, and, therefore, is inapplicable. The only conclusion is, then, that an
agent provocateur can potentially be charged under the Criminal Code, and
there is no special exculpatory section therein on which he can rely as a
defence.
With respect to specific statutes, the existence of a defence, of course,
depends on the wording of the particular enactment. In R. v. Ormerod, the
accused put forth s.49 of the Narcotics Control Regulations (Canada),
which permits a peace officer, inter alia, "to be in possession of a
narcotic for the purpose of, and in connection with, his employment therewith". Mr. Justice Laskin decided that this section would not excuse the
agent provocateur (an undercover policeman) in this case for: "In context,
s.49 does not cover possession as a direct consequence of trafficking which
ensues from solicitation by a policeman."' 0 6 Specific exoneration sections,
then, appear to be narrowly construed and, depending on the wording,
generally do not assist in the defence of an agent. Section 14(1) of the
Alberta Police Act' 07 seems to provide such a defense with respect to liquor
106 ibid., p. 240.
107
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offences, but the Ouimet Committee comments: "No similar exemption is
08
afforded by the criminal law of Canada in relation to criminal offences."'
The end result, then, is that in Canada an agent provocateur has no
special immunities or statutory exoneration unless such is made very clear in
a specific statute.

PART V-

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing it can be seen that very little in the area of entrapment is clear or certain. The theoretical basis has given rise to much dispute,
but no one soundly articulated and fully accepted foundation has emerged.
Even in the U.S. where the highest appellate tribunal has held that the
defence exists, and on what basis it does, there have been vociferous dissenters
even to the extreme of suggesting that the Supreme Court really obliterated
the defence instead of founding it. Canadian and English courts have
thoroughly avoided the issue, passing only occasional reference to it.
The liability of the agent provocateur, the actual instigator, is, in theory,
well laid down in cases and general criminal legislation. Whether or not it is
resorted to in practice depends in most cases (excluding those of public
pressure) on the exercise of the police discretion: agents generally are not
charged, though equally as culpable as the entrapped accused, but when a
charge is laid, barring specific statutory exoneration, he has no special
immunity or defence.
The ingredients of the concept are equally as mysterious, even to the
proper test which should serve as a guide to whether or not entrapment exists
in a given set of facts. The conflict of approach as to whether a subjective or
objective point of view, supported by the majority and minority, respectively,
in each of the two leading U.S. decisions on entrapment, should prevail has
never been resolved. Perhaps the ultimate solution rests in a combination
of both approaches; this is the position suggested in the recommendations of
the recent Ouiment Report for adoption in Canada. 09 The resolution of this
problem will, in turn, affect the evidentiary procedure at trial. Reliance
wholly on the subjective approach could well leave the accused open to
enquiries with respect to his character and reputation in the community of
unprecedented thoroughness and, in many cases, of devastating impact upon a
jury. The alternate, objective approach avoids this problem but does involve
a potential basis for judicial review of police tactics, a procedure which, many
argue, serves only to hamper the detection of crime by greatly increasing the
desire of the police to minimize legal liabilities respecting their methodology
of pursuit and capture. The issue of whether entrapment is a matter of law
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or a question of fact is also unsettled, and the arguments depend on which
judges are to be followed in the Sherman and Sorrells cases. It should again
be emphasized that courts in various jurisdictions have attempted to resolve
these issues, but the feeling persists that each case depends solely on its own
facts, and no precedential principles can be extracted despite deliberate
judicial endeavours to accomplish just this. What may be the most certain
result is that, at least in obvious cases, the accused is acquitted, although often
on dubious legal reasoning.
It has been suggested that in permitting a defence of entrapment, the
courts have found themselves in a paradoxical situation: while seeking to
remedy one wrong they permit another wrong to go unpunished. That is, by
excusing a criminal who has committed a crime on the basis that another person - the agent - has also breached the criminal law, the courts are offending the proverbial saying that "two wrongs do not make a right". The real
focus, perhaps, should be concentration on restraint of unwarranted police
activities, and, accordingly, we might lay down more definite rules wherein
entrapping manoeuvres would be set out and clearly prohibited, and all
offenders -

policemen or not -

would be prosecuted. This approach

would then remove entrapment as a complete defence for an accused,
alternatively, we might hold all evidence secured by the agent while overstepping prescribed bounds inadmissable against the accused as not having
been properly obtained." 0 This is the approach popular at present in an
analogous area, that of wiretapping and electronic surveillance. It has the
benefit of being highly practical and avoiding much of the above theoretical
uncertainty, while, at the same time, containing a substantial element of
justice and fair play.
Another suggestion might be to build the whole area into the Canadian
Bill of Rights, analogous to the U.S. constitutional notion of due process. It
has been argued that U.S. courts do base entrapment on the Constitution,
even though their judgments do not make reference to such a theoretical
basis."' However, our Bill of Rights, as presently constituted, certainly would
not be able to support this basis for entrapment." 2 The Canadian constitutional framework, so different from that in the United States, may well prevent
the entrenching of a principle which would serve as a foundation for entrapment. These, then, are only suggestions; for the moment we are still left with
a substantial amount of uncertainty."'
11o This connection between entrapment and coerced confessions was suggested in

a note, 74 Yale L.., 949-52 (1965).
Il Orfield, op. cit., p. 54 footnote 96, says of the U.S. position:
"It has been argued that, while the Courts in the U.S. do not employ constitutional
bases in theory, they do in fact." See Cowan, The Entrapment Doctrine in the
Federal Courts, 49 1. Crim. L, C & P.S. 447 at 449 (1959). With respect to the
U.S. fourth amendment limiting the right of police to search for offences, see NOTE,
74 Yale L. 942 (1965).
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footnote 6 points out that our present Bill of Rights has proved almost completely

ineffectual in the judicial process.
"3 Since the writing of this article, the decisions of R. v. Drybones [1970] S.C.R.
282, and R. v. Shipley [1970] 2 O.R. 411 have been reported.

